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POIN'l/

~DIJN'I'ER

POIN'I'
A DEBATE ON
IRONY AND
INTERPRETATION

Richard Lempert

Peter Westen

Can irony play a role in the construction of
statutes? In the following articles, legal scholars Richard Lempert and Peter Westen debate
the point, taking, as their context, the Supreme Court decision in United Steelworkers v.
Weber, a 1979 affirmative action case that brings
to the fore the moral dilemmas posed by such
programs.
Professor Lempert's initial article originally
appeared in Ethics 95 (October 1984), published
by the University of Chicago Press. Professor
Westen's response, and Lempert's rejoinder to
it, were written especially for Law Quadrangle
Notes.
Richard Lempert is a graduate of Oberlin
College and the University of Michigan Law
School; he also holds a Ph.D. in sociology
from the University of Michigan. He is particularly concerned with the problem of applying
social science research to legal issues. He is
editor of the Law & Society Review.
Peter Westen received his B.A. from Harvard College and his J.D. from the University
of California, Berkeley, where he was editor in
chief of the California Law Review. After serving
as law clerk to Supreme Court Justice William
0. Douglas, he worked abroad and in Washington, D.C. He joined the Law School faculty
in 1973. His principal scholarly interests are in
the fields of judicial procedure and legal
theory.
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POIN'I'
The Force of Irony:
On the Morality of
Affirmative Action and
United Steelworkers v. Weber
by Richard 0. Lempert
In recent years, affirmative action has
posed difficult problems not only for courts
and legislatures but also for individuals who
puzzle over what is just. The claims made both
by the proponents of programs that establish
preferences on the basis of race and by their
staunch opponents have an intuitive appeal. The
slave society that preceded the Civil War and the Jim
Crow era that endured for a century afterward are a
shameful legacy for a nation that seeks to define
itself in terms of justice and freedom. The proportionate underrepresentation of black people in
positions of power and privilege may plausibly be
traced to this legacy, giving moral force to the claim
that unique arrangements must be made to redress
this imbalance. But the intuitive case against special
preferences for blacks is also powerful. Demanding
unequal treatment in the name of equality has
an Orwellian cast to it, and those whites
whose opportunities are diminished by affirmative action have typically played no
role in creating the social conditions that
arguably justify it. 1
The Supreme Court has confronted the
affirmative action problem on several occasions but has, to my mind, made only one statement that is truly helpful to those who are more
concerned with the morality of such programs than
with what the Constitution will be interpreted to
permit. This case, United Steelworkers of America v.
Weber,2 arose out of a voluntary agreement between
the United Steelworkers and the Kaiser Aluminum
and Chemical Corporation, which reserved for blacks
50 percent of the openings in in-plant craft-training
programs until such time as the percentage of black
craftworkers in a plant was commensurate with the
percentage of blacks in the local labor force. Before
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this agreement was signed and the programs in
question established, Kaiser had hired as craftworkers only persons with prior craft experience.
These hirees were almost invariably white because
craft experience was usually available only through
craft unions, and these unions had historically excluded blacks.
Brian Weber was a white production worker who
wanted to enter his plant's craft-training program
and would, by virtue of his seniority, have been
admitted had not blacks with low~r seniority had a
preference. He brought suit alleging that his rights
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibits racial discrimination in employment, had
been violated. 3 The District Court and the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld Weber's complaint. A majority of the Supreme Court reversed the
decisions below and upheld the program, taking
pains to point out that the case involved statutory
rather than constitutional interpretation. In reversing,
the majority relied on two of the traditional guides to
statutory interpretation, the plain language of the
Civil Rights Act and the debate surrounding its
enactment. They also relied on a less traditional
resource, their sense of irony. Indeed, reading the
opinion, it appears that it was irony which was
ultimately controlling. The language of the statute
offers little comfort to supporters of affirmative action, and Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, has the better
of the argument from legislative history. Without
their sense of the ironic, the majority would have
had little from which they could legitimately discern
a congressional intent to allow institutions
subject to Title VII to agree voluntarily to
affirmative action quotas.
Irony is not a usual guide to statutory interpretation, and so it is understandably slighted by both majority
and dissent. The argument from irony
is spelled out in a statement by Justice Brennan which, if not essential
to a principled decision, might be
dismissed as a rhetorical flourish.
The rebuttal is confined to one of Justice
Rehnquist's thirty footnotes. Searching for the
spirit behind the Civil Rights Act, Brennan
writes, "It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of
racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of
those who have 'been excluded from the American
dream for so long' . . . constituted the first legislative
prohibition of all voluntary, private, race conscious
efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy."4 Rehnquist responds, "I see no
irony in a law tl).at prohibits all voluntary racial discrimination, even discrimination directed at whites in
favor of blacks. The evil inherent in discrimination against Negroes is that it is based on
an immutable characteristic, utterly irrelevant to employment decisions. The char-

acteristic becomes no less immutable
and irrelevant, and discrimination based
thereon becomes no less evil, simply
because the person excluded is a member of
one race rather than another. Far from ironic, I
find the prohibition on all preferential treatment
based on race as elementary and fundamental as the
principle that 'two wrongs do not make a right.'" 5
Rehnquist's rebuttal strikes a sound and familiar
note. These are words that even those who approve
of affirmative action programs want to agree with,
and for this reason they constitute the single most
useful statement the Court has produced for
those who seek to understand the moral
dilemma of affirmative action. To appreciate their powerful appeal is to
understand why large numbers of decent
people, including many supporters of the
civil rights movement, have opposed affirmative action. To perceive Justice
Rehnquist's error is to understand the moral
fervor of those who support affirmative action and
to recognize the underlying irony which makes the
majority argument from irony in Weber essentially
correct.
Rehnquist tells us that it is evil to base employment decisions (and by implication any decision that
allocates important rewards) on characteristics that
are utterly irrelevant to those decisions. We nod our
heads in agreement, but, even while doing so, we
are aware that employment and other decisions are
often affected by characteristics that have no relationship to the advantage sought. These include
styles of speech, height, family connections, hair
length, and nervous tics, to name a few. The best
among us are properly troubled by decisions which
separate people (i.e., discriminate) on the basis of
such irrelevancies, but as a society we do little to
eradicate such discrimination. This may be in
part because ,w e think the task impossible (or
not worth the cost), but it is also because,
however much we deplore such irrational
decision making, we do not think the discrimination involved creates an intolerably evil
world.
Intolerable evil is not something that is defined for us but is, instead, the product of
collective agreement. From time to time our views
change as to what bases for discrimination are intolerable, emphasizing the subjective nature of our
definitions. We can best appreciate this when our
consensus as to what is tolerable breaks down, as
has recently been the case with women and the
handicapped.
Thus, the question posed by Weber is not that
which Rehnquist implicitly answers, that is, Is discrimination on the basis of factors unrelated to the
job in question evil? The fact that race is the basis on
which Kaiser discriminated is as important as the fact
that race is unrelated to job skills. The crucial ques-

tion is whether such racial discrimination is
intolerably evil, or whether, evil or not, it is to
be tolerated like, for example, discrimination
on the basis of obesity.
The question does not appear difficult. Most of
us have been taught a correct answer. Race is special,
and discrimination on the basis of race is intolerable.
But why is this so? Why does racial discrimination
excite us when so many other kinds of discrimination
do not? It is because of the way we interpret history,
associating racial discrimination with practices that
now appear self-evidently evil: forcing blacks from
their homeland, enslaving blacks, lynching blacks for
actions that among whites would not be criminal,
intimidating blacks who sought to exercise their
rights-in sum, systematically disadvantaging a people in almost every way that mattered because of the
color of their skin. Blacks are not the only Americans
who have suffered the evils of discrimination, but no
other group has been disadvantaged simultaneously
in so many spheres, over such a long period of time,
and in such a peculiarly American way. Before we
were conscious of this, "to be discriminating" meant
to have good taste. It is the suffering of black people
that has given discrimination its bad name.
In this lies the deeper irony of Weber. 6 A claim
made by a white person as a member of the dominant majority draws its moral force largely from our
collective horror at centuries of oppressing black
people. It would be ironic indeed if evils visited on
blacks had lent enough force to the moral claims of
whites to prevent what appears to many at this point
to be the most effective means of eliminating the
legacy of those evils. Legislatures do not usually
intend to act ironically. The majority in Weber understood that Congress in 1964 was attacking the evil
of discrimination and not the word. Sensitive
to the irony that Rehnquist could not see,
they decided the case correctly.

@1984 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
Reprinted by permission.

1. For purposes of this essay I shall perceive the world as black
and white. One implication of the argument that follows is that
affirmative action programs for groups such as women or Chicanos are
more difficult to justify than affirmative action programs for blacks.
2. United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
3. Title VII provides in part: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for any employer, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling . . . on-the-job training programs to discriminate against
any individual because of his race . . . in admission to any program"
(Civil Rights Act, 1964, sec. 703[d], 78 Stat. 256, 42 U.S.C. Section
2000e- 2002[d]).
4. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 204.
5. Ibid., 228- 29 at n . 10.
6. There is a "shallower" irony as well. The in-plant training program in
United Steelworkers was begun in an effort to redress the racial imbalance
in Kaiser's craft work force. But for this need, which existed because of
the legacy of discrimination against blacks, there would have been no inplant training program for Brian Weber to be excluded from, or, if he
simply waited a bit longer, to enter.
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The Role of Irony in the
Construction of Statutes
by Peter Westen
L'ironie est le fond du
charactere de la Providence.
-Honore de Balzac
My friend and colleague Richard Lempert makes
important and interesting observations about the history of racial discrimination in this country, about the
difference between discriminating for blacks and discriminating against them, about the dilemmas of
affirmative action, and about the meaning of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. I have no quarrel with him on any
of those issues. I do have misgivings, however, about
what I regard as the most original of the things he
has to say-namely, that lawyers can usefully advert
to the existence of irony in determining the meaning
of statutes. I do not believe that true instances of
irony are, or ever can be, useful to lawyers in
~-...,... .construing statutes. Nor do I believe that potential instances of irony are illuminating. But
even if potential irony is illuminating in
some cases, I do not believe by Lempert's
own description of the Weber case that it
can lend any support to the Weber Court's
construction of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Lempert's argument about irony in Weber
consists of four steps:
(1) The question in Weber was whether a private
employer who voluntarily adopts a racial preference for blacks in a job-training program thereby
unlawfully "discriminate[s]" against white applicants "because of [their] race" within the meaning
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
(2) Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent in
Weber, "has the better of the argument from legislative history" in arguing that racial preferences as
described in (1) do violate the Civil Rights Act of
1964;
(3) Given that Congress adopted the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 in large part to give blacks the rightful
place in American society that they have for so
long been wrongfully denied, it would be ironic if
26

the Civil Rights Act were construed to invalidate a
mechanism that many people (and most blacks)
believe to be the most effective means of giving
blacks their rightful place in American society;
(4) The potential irony described in (3) adds sufficient force to the majority's position in Weber to
override the reading of legislative history by Justice
Rehnquist described in (2).
I am prepared to agree with Lempert on steps (1),
(2), and (3). But I do not agree with his conclusion
in step (4), because I do not believe that the potential irony of Justice Rehnquist's position overrides what Lempert concedes to be a persuasive
reading of legislative history. Moreover, I do not
believe that potential irony is ever likely to carry
weight in construing a statute, because when
irony occurs in the construction of a statute, irony
is likely to be inevitable however one construes the
statute.
To understand the uses and nonuses of irony in
law, it is important to know what "irony" means.
We ordinarily use the word "irony" in two quite
different senses. We sometimes use it to refer to the
figure of speech of explicitly saying one thing while
implicitly saying the opposite. Thus, when Stalin
asked of the Pope, "How many divisions does he
have?" Stalin was being ironic. What Stalin explicitly
said ("I do not know how many divisions the Pope
has") was the opposite of what he really meant ("I
know how many divisions the Pope has-none!"). As
the dictionary puts it, irony is
A figure of speech in which the intended meaning is the
opposite of that expressed by the words used, usually
taking the form of sarcasm or ridicule in which laudatory
expressions are used to imply condemnation or contempt
(Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 5, p. 484).

Sometimes, on the other hand, we use "irony" to
refer not to a figure of speech, but to a state of affairs
that has turned out to be the opposite of what one
expected. It is the latter meaning of irony to which
the dictionary refers when it defines irony as
A condition of affairs or events of a character opposite to
what was, or might be, expected (Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 5, p. 484).

This second sense of irony can arise in
two settings. It can arise descriptively,
when what a person actually does
(or is) turns out to be the opposite

of what he expected to do
(or be).
Thus, it is ironic that John
Alden
eventually married Priscilla himself, because John
Alden expected to be courting her for Miles Standish. Alternatively, irony in the second sense can
occur prescriptively, where what a person feels morally obliged to do turns out to be the opposite of
what he expected to feel obliged to do. Thus, it is
ironic that Thomas Jefferson as President felt he
ought to acquire the Louisiana Purchase for the
United States, because he had always believed that
the national government lacked the authority to make
such acquisitions without constitutional amendment.
Prescriptive irony, in turn, can arise for a variety of
reasons. It can occur because a person simply
changes his mind about what he believes he ought to
do. Thus, the irony that Richard Nixon felt that he
ought to be the first President to reopen relations
with the People's Republic of China after he had
personally led the opposition to such relations for so
long can be explained by the fact that Richard Nixon
changed his mind. Alternatively, prescriptive irony
can also arise when circumstances force one to
choose between values that one had always expected to be able to embrace simultaneously. Thus,
when Thomas Jefferson acquired the Louisiana Territory, it was not because he had
changed his political views, but because
circumstances forced him to choose
between two political views that he
had always expected to be able to
harmonize. He had always believed
both that the United States ought to
keep the Mississippi free for American
navigation and commerce, and that the
national government ought not to acquire vast
territory without constitutional amendment. He had
been able to adhere to both beliefs simultaneously,
because circumstances had not forced him to choose
one over the other. When Spain sold Louisiana to
Napoleon, and Napoleon threatened to close the port
of New Orleans to American navigation unless
the United States purchased the entire Louisiana Territory, Jefferson was forced to decide which of the two beliefs was stronger. It is ironic that he chose to purchase
Louisiana, just as it would have been ironic if he had chosen to let Napoleon close
the port of New Orleans; but the ironies
are nothing more or less than a spelling out
of the value judgments he made when he was
unexpectedly forced to trade one value for another.
What, then, does this taxonomy of irony have
to do with the construction of statutes? It means, I
think, that when we speak of irony in connection
with statutes, we are referring to the kind of irony
that obtained when Jefferson acquired the Louisiana
Purchase. By calling the construction of a statute
"ironic," we do not mean that the legislature used a
figure of speech by which it sarcastically said the

opposite of what it really meant. Nor do we mean to
be referring to a descriptive state of affairs that is the
opposite of what the legislature expected (or, at least,
we are not referring only to such a descriptive state of
affairs). We are referring to a prescriptive irony that
consists in a legislature's now being construed to
have prescribed something that it did not expect to
be prescribing. Moreover, when the latter irony
obtains, it is not because the legislature (or
court construing the legislature) changed
its mind, or because the legislature (or the
court construing the legislature) is hypocritical. It is because the world has turned
out to be so different from what the legislature originally expected that the legislature
cannot be deemed to have prescribed all the
things that it once expected to be prescribing.
To illustrate, assume that Justice Rehnquist
had rightly prevailed in Weber and that
the Supreme Court had construed the
Civil Rights Act as prohibiting private
employers from adopting voluntary
affirmative action programs for job
training. I assume, with Lempert,
that we would all regard such a decision as ironic. But why? What do we
mean by calling it "ironic"? In what does
the irony consist? Presumably it would consist in the Court now ascribing to Congress a
desire to prescribe something (i.e., to prohibit
private employers from voluntarily adopting racial
preferences for blacks) that is very different from
what Congress expected to be prescribing (i.e., to
permit private employers to take whatever voluntary
action was necessary to redress racial imbalance in
the workplace). Why, then, would a court ever construe a statute in such a way as to create irony? For
the same reason that'}efferson ended up acting ironically. For the same reason that Balzac called irony
"the basis of the character of Providence." Because
the world has so changed from what Congress originally expected in 1964 that the Court must ascribe to
Congress a desire to do something Congress never
expected to have to do if the Court is to give effect to
something it believed Congress desired to do even
more-that is, to prohibit private employers from
voluntarily classifying people, white or black, on the
basis of race. Congress presumably intended in 1964
to p~escribe two things: to permit private employers
to take whatever voluntary action appears to be
necessary to eliminate racial imbalance in the workplace; and to prohibit private employers from
classifying employees on the basis of race. Congress
believed at the time that it could simultaneously give
effect to both prescriptions. It now appears that the
world is different from what Congress expectedthat one must choose between allowing employers to
do what now appears to be necessary to eliminate
racial imbalance in the workplace, on the one hand,
and prohibiting them from classifying employees on

27

the basis of race, on the other hand. If the
Court had followed Rehnquist and prohibited affirmative action plans, thereby
creating irony, it would have done so only
because it believed that irony was the consequence of giving effect to what Congress
really desired to do under circumstances that
were so different from what Congress originally
expected.
If I am right about the relation between irony and
statutes, it follows that true instances of irony can
never be a guide to the construction of statutes. True
irony cannot be a guide to statutory construction
because true instances of irony arise only after a
court has already gone through the process of determining what the legislature really meant to prescribe
under changed circumstances. The irony does not
precede the construing of the statute. It is a consequence of construing the statute. It is simply a
spelling out of legislative desire in the face of
fate's having upset the legislature's plans.
Now it might be argued that while true instances of irony cannot play a role in the construction of statutes, that potential irony can
play a useful role. Thus, Lempert might argue
that while irony can play no role in the construction of the Civil Rights Act once one has already
determined what Congress would have intended under present circumstances, the potential irony of
Rehnquist's construction can play a role in determining what the Civil Rights Act means when one is
uncertain as to what Congress would have intended
under present circumstances. I see two problems,
however, with the latter argument. First, it ignores
the fact that where one plausible construction of a
statute creates irony in one respect, the alternative
construction will often (if not always) create counterirony in another respect. It is no accident that this
should be so. It is a consequence of the situation that
must obtain if construction is to create irony in the
first place. Irony is only possible if the situation has
so changed that the legislature must now be deemed
to have chosen one or the other of two values that it
once expected to prescribe jointly. If it would create
irony to now construe a statute in such a way as to
prefer one value (say, A) over the other (say, B), it
would also create irony to opt for the alternative
construction of selecting B over A.
Take the Weber case. Lempert is right that
Rehnquist's construction would be ironic, because it would attribute to Congress a view
that Congress in 1964 did not think it
would have to take. But by the same token, the majority's construction of the Civil
Rights Act is also ironic, because it attributes to Congress, in adopting one of the great
antidiscrimination statutes in history, a desire
to permit employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of race.
Second, even if potential irony were an argument
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against a given construction of a statute in an ambiguous case, it is not an argument against a given
construction that has already been determined to be
supported by a legislative history, because the irony
then is nothing but a spelling out of what legislative
intent has turned out to portend. Yet Lempert seems
to assume that Rehnquist was persuasive in his analysis of legislative history. If Rehnquist was indeed
right in his analysis of legislative history, then irony
can do nothing but spell out the consequences of
that history.
I would like to conclude by emphasizing what I am
not saying. I am not saying that voluntary affirmative
action programs by private employers should be
deemed illegal under the Civil Rights Act; or that
Rehnquist was right in his analysis of legislative
intent; or that the alternative constructions of
the Civil Rights Act are equally strong. I am
suggesting, rather, that even if Rehnquist
has at most a plausible argument in support of his construction of the statute in
Weber, irony can play no role in deciding
who was right in Weber, because irony
arises whichever way the case is decided.

REIOINDER
by Richard 0. Lempert
Peter Westen, in accepting an invitation to comment on my article, has properly focused not on the
substantive merits of affirmative action but on the
more interesting and general issue of the role of
irony in statutory construction. I respond briefly to
clarify one important particular in which Peter misconstrues my remarks, and to comment on what this
implies for our respective positions.
I write that Justice Rehnquist "has the better of the
argument from legislative history." Peter takes this to
mean that I concede Justice Rehnquist's position "to
be a persuasive reading of legislative history." To say
that someone has the better of the argument is not to
be persuaded. There is in Weber, as there often is
when difficult questions of statutory interpretation
arise, legislative history pointing in different directions. Moreover, the task is not to determine what
side can find more comfort in the floor debates, but
rather how Congress, most of whose members were
silent, intended the statute to apply in the case that
arose or how Congress would have intended it
to apply had they contemplated the case in
question.
In these circumstances, I do not think that
any aid to interpretation should be discarded a
priori, as Peter would apparently have us do
with irony. Nor do I think irony is necessarily
indeterminate in its implications. While competing meanings may have different ironical
aspects, this does not mean that irony cannot
be an aid in choosing between them. Just as
not all plausible interpretations of language
are equally persuasive, not all ironical implications are equally bothersome. In the instant
case and in other cases where a court must
apply a statute to an issue that was not anticipated
when the statute was enacted, a court is, it seems to
me, proceeding correctly when it identifies the basic
purpose of the statute and from this perspective
evaluates competing interpretations sensitive to the
ironies they produce. Thus, had Peter stopped after
writing, "while irony can play no role in the construction of the Civil Rights Act once one has already
determined what Congress would have intended under present circumstances, [it] can play a role when
one is uncertain as to what Congress would have
intended ... ,"I would have agreed with him entirely. Indeed, if there is an irony in our mterchange,
it is that Peter more than I begins to spell out the
basis for this position. This is an important
contribution.181
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